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| author | bors <bors@rust-lang.org> | 2022-09-18 14:10:57 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | bors <bors@rust-lang.org> | 2022-09-18 14:10:57 +0000 |
| commit | a37499ae66ec5fc52a93d71493b78fb141c32f6b (patch) | |
| tree | 26d26f1a75711967d423745d419c8bd98ed14808 /compiler/rustc_llvm/llvm-wrapper | |
| parent | 4af79ccd5e23c7cbaabcd7aefdda3b715abde606 (diff) | |
| parent | bd5aad3ee28fbc1f7cb4bd2c52763dbadaeae34a (diff) | |
| download | rust-a37499ae66ec5fc52a93d71493b78fb141c32f6b.tar.gz rust-a37499ae66ec5fc52a93d71493b78fb141c32f6b.zip | |
Auto merge of #101332 - sashashura:patch-1, r=pietroalbini
GitHub Workflows security hardening This PR adds explicit [permissions section](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions) to workflows. This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with [extended set of permissions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/automatic-token-authentication#permissions-for-the-github_token) (except from `on: pull_request` [from external forks](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)). By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an [injection](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/) or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted. It is recommended to have [most strict permissions on the top level](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#token-permissions) and grant write permissions on [job level](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-jobs/assigning-permissions-to-jobs) case by case.
Diffstat (limited to 'compiler/rustc_llvm/llvm-wrapper')
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