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Revert SGX inline asm syntax
This was erroneously changed in #83387
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On x86, the default syntax is also switched to Intel to match asm!
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This was erroneously changed in #83387
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In #75979 several inlined modules were split out into multiple files.
This PR keeps the multiple files but moves a few things around to
organize things in a coherent way.
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Add is_enclave_range/is_user_range overflow checks
Fixes #76343.
This adds overflow checking to `is_enclave_range` and `is_user_range` in `sgx::os::fortanix_sgx::mem` in order to mitigate possible security issues with enclave code. It also accounts for an edge case where the memory range provided ends exactly at the end of the address space, where calculating `p + len` would overflow back to zero despite the range potentially being valid.
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`#[deny(unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn)]` in sys/sgx
This is part of #73904.
Enclose unsafe operations in unsafe blocks in `libstd/sys/sgx`.
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Run `./x.py` fmt
Add reference link
Fix reference link
Apply review suggestions.
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Functions such as `is_enclave_range` and `is_user_range` in
`sgx::os::fortanix_sgx::mem` are often used to make sure memory ranges
passed to an enclave from untrusted code or passed to other trusted code
functions are safe to use for their intended purpose. Currently, these
functions do not perform any checks to make sure the range provided
doesn't overflow when adding the range length to the base address. While
debug builds will panic if overflow occurs, release builds will simply
wrap the result, leading to false positive results for either function.
The burden is placed on application authors to know to perform overflow
checks on their own before calling these functions, which can easily
lead to security vulnerabilities if omitted. Additionally, since such
checks are performed in the Intel SGX SDK versions of these functions,
developers migrating from Intel SGX SDK code may expect these functions
to operate the same.
This commit adds explicit overflow checking to `is_enclave_range` and
`is_user_range`, returning `false` if overflow occurs in order to
prevent misuse of invalid memory ranges. It also alters the checks to
account for ranges that lie exactly at the end of the address space,
where calculating `p + len` would overflow despite the range being
valid.
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Also doing fmt inplace as requested.
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