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Clarify that when `BorrowedHandle`, `OwnedHandle`, or `HandleOrNull`
hold the value `-1`, it always means the current process handle, and not
`INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE`.
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r=joshtriplett
Make `BorrowedFd::borrow_raw` a const fn.
Making `BorrowedFd::borrow_raw` a const fn allows it to be used to
create a constant `BorrowedFd<'static>` holding constants such as
`AT_FDCWD`. This will allow [`rustix::fs::cwd`] to become a const fn.
For consistency, make similar changes to `BorrowedHandle::borrow_raw`
and `BorrowedSocket::borrow_raw`.
[`rustix::fs::cwd`]: https://docs.rs/rustix/latest/rustix/fs/fn.cwd.html
r? `@joshtriplett`
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Fixes #96718.
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CC #27709 (tracking issue for the `ip` feature which contains more
functions)
The function `Ipv6Addr::to_ipv4` is bad because it also returns an IPv4
address for the IPv6 loopback address `::1`. Stabilize
`Ipv6Addr::to_ipv4_mapped` so we can recommend that function instead.
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Issue #84096 changed the hashmap RNG to use BCryptGenRandom instead of
RtlGenRandom on Windows.
Mozilla Firefox started experiencing random failures in
env_logger::Builder::new() (Issue #94098) during initialization of their
unsandboxed main process with an "Access Denied" error message from
BCryptGenRandom(), which is used by the HashMap contained in
env_logger::Builder
The root cause appears to be a virus scanner or other software interfering
with BCrypt DLLs loading.
This change adds a fallback option if BCryptGenRandom is unusable for
whatever reason. It will fallback to RtlGenRandom in this case.
Fixes #94098
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Use Rust 2021 prelude in std itself.
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Second attempt at implementing [OsStr]::join.
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Revert "Implement [OsStr]::join", which was merged without FCP.
This reverts commit 4fcbc53820ab423bbeb41f07822369aa05da1d68, see https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/96744. (I'm terribly sorry, and truly don't remember r+ing it, or even having seen it before yesterday, which is... genuinely very worrisome for me).
r? `@m-ou-se`
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Improve floating point documentation
This is my attempt to improve/solve https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/95468 and https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/73328 .
Added/refined explanations:
- Refine the "NaN as a special value" top level explanation of f32
- Refine `const NAN` docstring: add an explanation about there being multitude of NaN bitpatterns and disclaimer about the portability/stability guarantees.
- Refine `fn is_sign_positive` and `fn is_sign_negative` docstrings: add disclaimer about the sign bit of NaNs.
- Refine `fn min` and `fn max` docstrings: explain the semantics and their relationship to the standard and libm better.
- Refine `fn trunc` docstrings: explain the semantics slightly more.
- Refine `fn powi` docstrings: add disclaimer that the rounding behaviour might be different from `powf`.
- Refine `fn copysign` docstrings: add disclaimer about payloads of NaNs.
- Refine `minimum` and `maximum`: add disclaimer that "propagating NaN" doesn't mean that propagating the NaN bit patterns is guaranteed.
- Refine `max` and `min` docstrings: add "ignoring NaN" to bring the one-row explanation to parity with `minimum` and `maximum`.
Cosmetic changes:
- Reword `NaN` and `NAN` as plain "NaN", unless they refer to the specific `const NAN`.
- Reword "a number" to `self` in function docstrings to clarify.
- Remove "Returns NAN if the number is NAN" from `abs`, as this is told to be the default behavior in the top explanation.
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Remove `#[rustc_deprecated]`
This removes `#[rustc_deprecated]` and introduces diagnostics to help users to the right direction (that being `#[deprecated]`). All uses of `#[rustc_deprecated]` have been converted. CI is expected to fail initially; this requires #95958, which includes converting `stdarch`.
I plan on following up in a short while (maybe a bootstrap cycle?) removing the diagnostics, as they're only intended to be short-term.
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[feat] Make sys::windows::os_str::Slice repr(transparent)
Fixes #96577
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Add more diagnostic items
This just adds a handful diagnostic items I noticed were missing.
Would it be worth doing this for all of the remaining types? I'm willing to do it if it'd be helpful.
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This reverts commit 4fcbc53820ab423bbeb41f07822369aa05da1d68.
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Create clippy lint against unexpectedly late drop for temporaries in match scrutinee expressions
A new clippy lint for issue 93883 (https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/93883). Relies on a new trait in `marker` (called `SignificantDrop` to enable linting), which is why this PR is for the rust-lang repo and not the clippy repo.
changelog: new lint [`significant_drop_in_scrutinee`]
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Remove hard links from `env::current_exe` security example
The security example shows that `env::current_exe` will return the path used when the program was started. This is not really surprising considering how hard links work: after `ln foo bar`, the two files are _equivalent_. It is _not_ the case that `bar` is a “link” to `foo`, nor is `foo` a link to `bar`. They are simply two names for the same underlying data.
The security vulnerability linked to seems to be different: there an attacker would start a SUID binary from a directory under the control of the attacker. The binary would respawn itself by executing the program found at `/proc/self/exe` (which the attacker can control). This is a real problem. In my opinion, the example given here doesn’t really show the same problem, it just shows a misunderstanding of what hard links are.
I looked through the history a bit and found that the example was introduced in https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/33526. That PR actually has two commits, and the first (https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/commit/8478d48dad949b3b1374569a5391089a49094eeb) explains the race condition at the root of the linked security vulnerability. The second commit proceeds to replace the explanation with the example we have today.
This commit reverts most of the second commit from https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/33526.
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Add aliases for std::fs::canonicalize
The aliases are `realpath` and `GetFinalPathNameByHandle` which are explicitly mentioned in `canonicalize`'s documentation.
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Use 64-bit time on 32-bit linux-gnu
The standard library suffered the [Year 2038 problem][Y2038] in two main places on targets with 32-bit `time_t`:
- In `std::time::SystemTime`, we stored a `timespec` that has `time_t` seconds. This is now changed to directly store 64-bit seconds and nanoseconds, and on 32-bit linux-gnu we try to use `__clock_gettime64` (glibc 2.34+) to get the larger timestamp.
- In `std::fs::Metadata`, we store a `stat64`, which has 64-bit `off_t` but still 32-bit `time_t`, and unfortunately that is baked in the API by the (deprecated) `MetadataExt::as_raw_stat()`. However, we can use `statx` for 64-bit `statx_timestamp` to store in addition to the `stat64`, as we already do to support creation time, and the rest of the `MetadataExt` methods can return those full values. Note that some filesystems may still be limited in their actual timestamp support, but that's not something Rust can change.
There remain a few places that need `timespec` for system call timeouts -- I leave that to future work.
[Y2038]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Year_2038_problem
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update `jemallocator` example to use 2018 edition import syntax
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Add a dedicated length-prefixing method to `Hasher`
This accomplishes two main goals:
- Make it clear who is responsible for prefix-freedom, including how they should do it
- Make it feasible for a `Hasher` that *doesn't* care about Hash-DoS resistance to get better performance by not hashing lengths
This does not change rustc-hash, since that's in an external crate, but that could potentially use it in future.
Fixes #94026
r? rust-lang/libs
---
The core of this change is the following two new methods on `Hasher`:
```rust
pub trait Hasher {
/// Writes a length prefix into this hasher, as part of being prefix-free.
///
/// If you're implementing [`Hash`] for a custom collection, call this before
/// writing its contents to this `Hasher`. That way
/// `(collection![1, 2, 3], collection![4, 5])` and
/// `(collection![1, 2], collection![3, 4, 5])` will provide different
/// sequences of values to the `Hasher`
///
/// The `impl<T> Hash for [T]` includes a call to this method, so if you're
/// hashing a slice (or array or vector) via its `Hash::hash` method,
/// you should **not** call this yourself.
///
/// This method is only for providing domain separation. If you want to
/// hash a `usize` that represents part of the *data*, then it's important
/// that you pass it to [`Hasher::write_usize`] instead of to this method.
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// #![feature(hasher_prefixfree_extras)]
/// # // Stubs to make the `impl` below pass the compiler
/// # struct MyCollection<T>(Option<T>);
/// # impl<T> MyCollection<T> {
/// # fn len(&self) -> usize { todo!() }
/// # }
/// # impl<'a, T> IntoIterator for &'a MyCollection<T> {
/// # type Item = T;
/// # type IntoIter = std::iter::Empty<T>;
/// # fn into_iter(self) -> Self::IntoIter { todo!() }
/// # }
///
/// use std::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
/// impl<T: Hash> Hash for MyCollection<T> {
/// fn hash<H: Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) {
/// state.write_length_prefix(self.len());
/// for elt in self {
/// elt.hash(state);
/// }
/// }
/// }
/// ```
///
/// # Note to Implementers
///
/// If you've decided that your `Hasher` is willing to be susceptible to
/// Hash-DoS attacks, then you might consider skipping hashing some or all
/// of the `len` provided in the name of increased performance.
#[inline]
#[unstable(feature = "hasher_prefixfree_extras", issue = "88888888")]
fn write_length_prefix(&mut self, len: usize) {
self.write_usize(len);
}
/// Writes a single `str` into this hasher.
///
/// If you're implementing [`Hash`], you generally do not need to call this,
/// as the `impl Hash for str` does, so you can just use that.
///
/// This includes the domain separator for prefix-freedom, so you should
/// **not** call `Self::write_length_prefix` before calling this.
///
/// # Note to Implementers
///
/// The default implementation of this method includes a call to
/// [`Self::write_length_prefix`], so if your implementation of `Hasher`
/// doesn't care about prefix-freedom and you've thus overridden
/// that method to do nothing, there's no need to override this one.
///
/// This method is available to be overridden separately from the others
/// as `str` being UTF-8 means that it never contains `0xFF` bytes, which
/// can be used to provide prefix-freedom cheaper than hashing a length.
///
/// For example, if your `Hasher` works byte-by-byte (perhaps by accumulating
/// them into a buffer), then you can hash the bytes of the `str` followed
/// by a single `0xFF` byte.
///
/// If your `Hasher` works in chunks, you can also do this by being careful
/// about how you pad partial chunks. If the chunks are padded with `0x00`
/// bytes then just hashing an extra `0xFF` byte doesn't necessarily
/// provide prefix-freedom, as `"ab"` and `"ab\u{0}"` would likely hash
/// the same sequence of chunks. But if you pad with `0xFF` bytes instead,
/// ensuring at least one padding byte, then it can often provide
/// prefix-freedom cheaper than hashing the length would.
#[inline]
#[unstable(feature = "hasher_prefixfree_extras", issue = "88888888")]
fn write_str(&mut self, s: &str) {
self.write_length_prefix(s.len());
self.write(s.as_bytes());
}
}
```
With updates to the `Hash` implementations for slices and containers to call `write_length_prefix` instead of `write_usize`.
`write_str` defaults to using `write_length_prefix` since, as was pointed out in the issue, the `write_u8(0xFF)` approach is insufficient for hashers that work in chunks, as those would hash `"a\u{0}"` and `"a"` to the same thing. But since `SipHash` works byte-wise (there's an internal buffer to accumulate bytes until a full chunk is available) it overrides `write_str` to continue to use the add-non-UTF-8-byte approach.
---
Compatibility:
Because the default implementation of `write_length_prefix` calls `write_usize`, the changed hash implementation for slices will do the same thing the old one did on existing `Hasher`s.
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Use futex-based locks and thread parker on {Free, Open, DragonFly}BSD.
This switches *BSD to our futex-based locks and thread parker.
Tracking issue: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/93740
This is a draft, because this still needs a new version of the `libc` crate to be published that includes https://github.com/rust-lang/libc/pull/2770.
r? `@Amanieu`
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This accomplishes two main goals:
- Make it clear who is responsible for prefix-freedom, including how they should do it
- Make it feasible for a `Hasher` that *doesn't* care about Hash-DoS resistance to get better performance by not hashing lengths
This does not change rustc-hash, since that's in an external crate, but that could potentially use it in future.
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Implement [OsStr]::join
Implements join for `OsStr` and `OsString` slices:
```Rust
let strings = [OsStr::new("hello"), OsStr::new("dear"), OsStr::new("world")];
assert_eq!("hello dear world", strings.join(OsStr::new(" ")));
````
This saves one from converting to strings and back, or from implementing it manually.
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We don't guarantee this panics. On most platforms it doesn't anymore.
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Make it clear that `to_ipv4` returns an IPv4 address for the IPv6 loopback
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r=m-ou-se
Relax memory ordering used in SameMutexCheck
`SameMutexCheck` only requires atomicity for `self.addr`, but does not need ordering of other memory accesses in either the success or failure case. Using `Relaxed`, the code still correctly handles the case when two threads race to store an address.
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Relax memory ordering used in `min_stack`
`min_stack` does not provide any synchronization guarantees to its callers, and only requires atomicity for `MIN` itself, so relaxed memory ordering is sufficient.
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This allows using `ReadBuf` in a builder-like style and to setup a `ReadBuf` and
pass it to `read_buf` in a single expression, e.g.,
```
// With this PR:
reader.read_buf(ReadBuf::uninit(buf).assume_init(init_len))?;
// Previously:
let mut buf = ReadBuf::uninit(buf);
buf.assume_init(init_len);
reader.read_buf(&mut buf)?;
```
Signed-off-by: Nick Cameron <nrc@ncameron.org>
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The security example shows that `env::current_exe` will return the
path used when the program was started. This is not really surprising
considering how hard links work: after `ln foo bar`, the two files are
_equivalent_. It is _not_ the case that `bar` is a “link” to `foo`,
nor is `foo` a link to `bar`. They are simply two names for the same
underlying data.
The security vulnerability linked to seems to be different: there an
attacker would start a SUID binary from a directory under the control
of the attacker. The binary would respawn itself by executing the
program found at `/proc/self/exe` (which the attacker can control).
This is a real problem. In my opinion, the example given here doesn’t
really show the same problem, it just shows a misunderstanding of what
hard links are.
I looked through the history a bit and found that the example was
introduced in #33526. That PR actually has two commits, and the
first (8478d48dad949b3b1374569a5391089a49094eeb) explains the race
condition at the root of the linked security vulnerability. The second
commit proceeds to replace the explanation with the example we have
today.
This commit reverts most of the second commit from #33526.
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The latest NetBSD release doesn't include the futex syscall yet.
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