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authorklensy <klensy@users.noreply.github.com>2024-12-07 13:51:08 +0300
committerklensy <klensy@users.noreply.github.com>2025-07-03 10:51:06 +0300
commitc76d032f0144b650a438ee1efba89c475e0b115b (patch)
tree88aad6141d0dd4a3dd1ce5de8c38b001c5bd3ba4 /library/std/src/sys/random
parentf51c9870bab634afb9e7a262b6ca7816bb9e940d (diff)
downloadrust-c76d032f0144b650a438ee1efba89c475e0b115b.tar.gz
rust-c76d032f0144b650a438ee1efba89c475e0b115b.zip
setup CI and tidy to use typos for spellchecking and fix few typos
Diffstat (limited to 'library/std/src/sys/random')
-rw-r--r--library/std/src/sys/random/linux.rs4
-rw-r--r--library/std/src/sys/random/unsupported.rs2
2 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/library/std/src/sys/random/linux.rs b/library/std/src/sys/random/linux.rs
index 18196fae28b..53e2f1da675 100644
--- a/library/std/src/sys/random/linux.rs
+++ b/library/std/src/sys/random/linux.rs
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 //! bytes, while the non-blocking pool, once initialized using the blocking
 //! pool, uses a CPRNG to return an unlimited number of random bytes. With a
 //! strong enough CPRNG however, the entropy estimation didn't contribute that
-//! much towards security while being an excellent vector for DoS attacs. Thus,
+//! much towards security while being an excellent vector for DoS attacks. Thus,
 //! the blocking pool was removed in kernel version 5.6.[^2] That patch did not
 //! magically increase the quality of the non-blocking pool, however, so we can
 //! safely consider it strong enough even in older kernel versions and use it
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 //! data the system has available at the time.
 //!
 //! So in conclusion, we always want the output of the non-blocking pool, but
-//! may need to wait until it is initalized. The default behavior of `getrandom`
+//! may need to wait until it is initialized. The default behavior of `getrandom`
 //! is to wait until the non-blocking pool is initialized and then draw from there,
 //! so if `getrandom` is available, we use its default to generate the bytes. For
 //! `HashMap`, however, we need to specify the `GRND_INSECURE` flags, but that
diff --git a/library/std/src/sys/random/unsupported.rs b/library/std/src/sys/random/unsupported.rs
index d68ce4a9e87..894409b395a 100644
--- a/library/std/src/sys/random/unsupported.rs
+++ b/library/std/src/sys/random/unsupported.rs
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ pub fn fill_bytes(_: &mut [u8]) {
 
 pub fn hashmap_random_keys() -> (u64, u64) {
     // Use allocation addresses for a bit of randomness. This isn't
-    // particularily secure, but there isn't really an alternative.
+    // particularly secure, but there isn't really an alternative.
     let stack = 0u8;
     let heap = Box::new(0u8);
     let k1 = ptr::from_ref(&stack).addr() as u64;