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-rw-r--r--src/doc/rustc/src/exploit-mitigations.md40
-rw-r--r--src/doc/unstable-book/src/compiler-flags/sanitizer.md181
-rw-r--r--src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_add_canonical_jump_tables_flag.rs14
-rw-r--r--src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_emit_type_checks.rs24
-rw-r--r--src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_emit_type_metadata.rs31
5 files changed, 271 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/src/doc/rustc/src/exploit-mitigations.md b/src/doc/rustc/src/exploit-mitigations.md
index 70df5170b21..fa38dd54d60 100644
--- a/src/doc/rustc/src/exploit-mitigations.md
+++ b/src/doc/rustc/src/exploit-mitigations.md
@@ -123,9 +123,9 @@ equivalent.
   <tr>
    <td>Forward-edge control flow protection
    </td>
-   <td>No
+   <td>Yes
    </td>
-   <td>
+   <td>Nightly
    </td>
   </tr>
   <tr>
@@ -465,24 +465,27 @@ implementations such as [LLVM ControlFlowIntegrity
 commercially available [grsecurity/PaX Reuse Attack Protector
 (RAP)](https://grsecurity.net/rap_faq).
 
-The Rust compiler does not support forward-edge control flow protection on
-Linux<sup id="fnref:6" role="doc-noteref"><a href="#fn:6"
-class="footnote">6</a></sup>. There is work currently ongoing to add support
-for the [sanitizers](https://github.com/google/sanitizers)[40], which may or
-may not include support for LLVM CFI.
+The Rust compiler supports forward-edge control flow protection on nightly
+builds[40]-[41] <sup id="fnref:6" role="doc-noteref"><a href="#fn:6"
+class="footnote">6</a></sup>.
 
 ```text
-$ readelf -s target/release/hello-rust | grep __cfi_init
+$ readelf -s -W target/debug/rust-cfi | grep "\.cfi"
+    12: 0000000000005170    46 FUNC    LOCAL  DEFAULT   14 _RNvCsjaOHoaNjor6_8rust_cfi7add_one.cfi
+    15: 00000000000051a0    16 FUNC    LOCAL  DEFAULT   14 _RNvCsjaOHoaNjor6_8rust_cfi7add_two.cfi
+    17: 0000000000005270   396 FUNC    LOCAL  DEFAULT   14 _RNvCsjaOHoaNjor6_8rust_cfi4main.cfi
+...
 ```
-Fig. 15. Checking if LLVM CFI is enabled for a given binary.
+Fig. 15. Checking if LLVM CFI is enabled for a given binary[41].
 
-The presence of the `__cfi_init` symbol (and references to `__cfi_check`)
-indicates that LLVM CFI (i.e., forward-edge control flow protection) is
-enabled for a given binary. Conversely, the absence of the `__cfi_init`
-symbol (and references to `__cfi_check`) indicates that LLVM CFI is not
-enabled for a given binary (see Fig. 15).
+The presence of symbols suffixed with ".cfi" or the `__cfi_init` symbol (and
+references to `__cfi_check`) indicates that LLVM CFI (i.e., forward-edge control
+flow protection) is enabled for a given binary. Conversely, the absence of
+symbols suffixed with ".cfi" or the `__cfi_init` symbol (and references to
+`__cfi_check`) indicates that LLVM CFI is not enabled for a given binary (see
+Fig. 15).
 
-<small id="fn:6">6\. It supports Control Flow Guard (CFG) on Windows (see
+<small id="fn:6">6\. It also supports Control Flow Guard (CFG) on Windows (see
 <https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/68793>). <a href="#fnref:6"
 class="reversefootnote" role="doc-backlink">↩</a></small>
 
@@ -689,5 +692,8 @@ defaults (unrelated to `READ_IMPLIES_EXEC`).
 39. A. Crichton. “Remove the alloc\_jemalloc crate #55238.” GitHub.
     <https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/55238>.
 
-40. J. Aparicio. 2017. “Tracking issue for sanitizer support #39699.”
-    <https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/39699>.
+40. R. de C Valle. “Tracking Issue for LLVM Control Flow Integrity (CFI) Support
+    for Rust #89653.” GitHub. <https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/89653>.
+
+41. “ControlFlowIntegrity.” The Rust Unstable Book.
+    <https://doc.rust-lang.org/beta/unstable-book/compiler-flags/sanitizer.html#controlflowintegrity>.
diff --git a/src/doc/unstable-book/src/compiler-flags/sanitizer.md b/src/doc/unstable-book/src/compiler-flags/sanitizer.md
index 29a267053b4..b3dbc9a9956 100644
--- a/src/doc/unstable-book/src/compiler-flags/sanitizer.md
+++ b/src/doc/unstable-book/src/compiler-flags/sanitizer.md
@@ -1,19 +1,24 @@
 # `sanitizer`
 
-The tracking issue for this feature is: [#39699](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/39699).
+The tracking issues for this feature are:
+
+* [#39699](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/39699).
+* [#89653](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/89653).
 
 ------------------------
 
 This feature allows for use of one of following sanitizers:
 
 * [AddressSanitizer][clang-asan] a fast memory error detector.
+* [ControlFlowIntegrity][clang-cfi] LLVM Control Flow Integrity (CFI) provides
+  forward-edge control flow protection.
 * [HWAddressSanitizer][clang-hwasan] a memory error detector similar to
   AddressSanitizer, but based on partial hardware assistance.
 * [LeakSanitizer][clang-lsan] a run-time memory leak detector.
 * [MemorySanitizer][clang-msan] a detector of uninitialized reads.
 * [ThreadSanitizer][clang-tsan] a fast data race detector.
 
-To enable a sanitizer compile with `-Zsanitizer=address`,
+To enable a sanitizer compile with `-Zsanitizer=address`,`-Zsanitizer=cfi`,
 `-Zsanitizer=hwaddress`, `-Zsanitizer=leak`, `-Zsanitizer=memory` or
 `-Zsanitizer=thread`.
 
@@ -177,6 +182,176 @@ Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
 ==39249==ABORTING
 ```
 
+# ControlFlowIntegrity
+
+The LLVM Control Flow Integrity (CFI) support in the Rust compiler initially
+provides forward-edge control flow protection for Rust-compiled code only by
+aggregating function pointers in groups identified by their number of arguments.
+
+Forward-edge control flow protection for C or C++ and Rust -compiled code "mixed
+binaries" (i.e., for when C or C++ and Rust -compiled code share the same
+virtual address space) will be provided in later work by defining and using
+compatible type identifiers (see Type metadata in the design document in the
+tracking issue [#89653](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/89653)).
+
+LLVM CFI can be enabled with -Zsanitizer=cfi and requires LTO (i.e., -Clto).
+
+## Example
+
+```text
+#![feature(asm, naked_functions)]
+
+use std::mem;
+
+fn add_one(x: i32) -> i32 {
+    x + 1
+}
+
+#[naked]
+pub extern "C" fn add_two(x: i32) {
+    // x + 2 preceeded by a landing pad/nop block
+    unsafe {
+        asm!(
+            "
+             nop
+             nop
+             nop
+             nop
+             nop
+             nop
+             nop
+             nop
+             nop
+             lea rax, [rdi+2]
+             ret
+        ",
+            options(noreturn)
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+fn do_twice(f: fn(i32) -> i32, arg: i32) -> i32 {
+    f(arg) + f(arg)
+}
+
+fn main() {
+    let answer = do_twice(add_one, 5);
+
+    println!("The answer is: {}", answer);
+
+    println!("With CFI enabled, you should not see the next answer");
+    let f: fn(i32) -> i32 = unsafe {
+        // Offsets 0-8 make it land in the landing pad/nop block, and offsets 1-8 are
+        // invalid branch/call destinations (i.e., within the body of the function).
+        mem::transmute::<*const u8, fn(i32) -> i32>((add_two as *const u8).offset(5))
+    };
+    let next_answer = do_twice(f, 5);
+
+    println!("The next answer is: {}", next_answer);
+}
+```
+Fig. 1. Modified example from the [Advanced Functions and
+Closures][rust-book-ch19-05] chapter of the [The Rust Programming
+Language][rust-book] book.
+
+[//]: # (FIXME: Replace with output from cargo using nightly when #89652 is merged)
+
+```shell
+$ rustc rust_cfi.rs -o rust_cfi
+$ ./rust_cfi
+The answer is: 12
+With CFI enabled, you should not see the next answer
+The next answer is: 14
+$
+```
+Fig. 2. Build and execution of the modified example with LLVM CFI disabled.
+
+[//]: # (FIXME: Replace with output from cargo using nightly when #89652 is merged)
+
+```shell
+$ rustc -Clto -Zsanitizer=cfi rust_cfi.rs -o rust_cfi
+$ ./rust_cfi
+The answer is: 12
+With CFI enabled, you should not see the next answer
+Illegal instruction
+$
+```
+Fig. 3. Build and execution of the modified example with LLVM CFI enabled.
+
+When LLVM CFI is enabled, if there are any attempts to change/hijack control
+flow using an indirect branch/call to an invalid destination, the execution is
+terminated (see Fig. 3).
+
+```rust
+use std::mem;
+
+fn add_one(x: i32) -> i32 {
+    x + 1
+}
+
+fn add_two(x: i32, _y: i32) -> i32 {
+    x + 2
+}
+
+fn do_twice(f: fn(i32) -> i32, arg: i32) -> i32 {
+    f(arg) + f(arg)
+}
+
+fn main() {
+    let answer = do_twice(add_one, 5);
+
+    println!("The answer is: {}", answer);
+
+    println!("With CFI enabled, you should not see the next answer");
+    let f: fn(i32) -> i32 =
+        unsafe { mem::transmute::<*const u8, fn(i32) -> i32>(add_two as *const u8) };
+    let next_answer = do_twice(f, 5);
+
+    println!("The next answer is: {}", next_answer);
+}
+```
+Fig. 4. Another modified example from the [Advanced Functions and
+Closures][rust-book-ch19-05] chapter of the [The Rust Programming
+Language][rust-book] book.
+
+[//]: # (FIXME: Replace with output from cargo using nightly when #89652 is merged)
+
+```shell
+$ rustc rust_cfi.rs -o rust_cfi
+$ ./rust_cfi
+The answer is: 12
+With CFI enabled, you should not see the next answer
+The next answer is: 14
+$
+```
+Fig. 5. Build and execution of the modified example with LLVM CFI disabled.
+
+[//]: # (FIXME: Replace with output from cargo using nightly when #89652 is merged)
+
+```shell
+$ rustc -Clto -Zsanitizer=cfi rust_cfi.rs -o rust_cfi
+$ ./rust_cfi
+The answer is: 12
+With CFI enabled, you should not see the next answer
+Illegal instruction
+$
+```
+Fig. 6. Build and execution of the modified example with LLVM CFI enabled.
+
+When LLVM CFI is enabled, if there are any attempts to change/hijack control
+flow using an indirect branch/call to a function with different number of
+arguments than intended/passed in the call/branch site, the execution is also
+terminated (see Fig. 6).
+
+Forward-edge control flow protection not only by aggregating function pointers
+in groups identified by their number of arguments, but also their argument
+types, will also be provided in later work by defining and using compatible type
+identifiers (see Type metadata in the design document in the tracking
+issue [#89653](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/89653)).
+
+[rust-book-ch19-05]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/book/ch19-05-advanced-functions-and-closures.html
+[rust-book]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/book/title-page.html
+
 # HWAddressSanitizer
 
 HWAddressSanitizer is a newer variant of AddressSanitizer that consumes much
@@ -404,12 +579,14 @@ Sanitizers produce symbolized stacktraces when llvm-symbolizer binary is in `PAT
 
 * [Sanitizers project page](https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/)
 * [AddressSanitizer in Clang][clang-asan]
+* [ControlFlowIntegrity in Clang][clang-cfi]
 * [HWAddressSanitizer in Clang][clang-hwasan]
 * [LeakSanitizer in Clang][clang-lsan]
 * [MemorySanitizer in Clang][clang-msan]
 * [ThreadSanitizer in Clang][clang-tsan]
 
 [clang-asan]: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AddressSanitizer.html
+[clang-cfi]: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html
 [clang-hwasan]: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html
 [clang-lsan]: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/LeakSanitizer.html
 [clang-msan]: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/MemorySanitizer.html
diff --git a/src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_add_canonical_jump_tables_flag.rs b/src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_add_canonical_jump_tables_flag.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..68f81808861
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_add_canonical_jump_tables_flag.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// Verifies that "CFI Canonical Jump Tables" module flag is added.
+//
+// ignore-windows
+// needs-sanitizer-cfi
+// only-aarch64
+// only-x86_64
+// compile-flags: -Clto -Zsanitizer=cfi
+
+#![crate_type="lib"]
+
+pub fn foo() {
+}
+
+// CHECK: !{{[0-9]+}} = !{i32 2, !"CFI Canonical Jump Tables", i32 1}
diff --git a/src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_emit_type_checks.rs b/src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_emit_type_checks.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9ed0422ceff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_emit_type_checks.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+// Verifies that pointer type membership tests for indirect calls are emitted.
+//
+// ignore-windows
+// needs-sanitizer-cfi
+// only-aarch64
+// only-x86_64
+// compile-flags: -Clto -Cno-prepopulate-passes -Zsanitizer=cfi
+
+#![crate_type="lib"]
+
+pub fn foo(f: fn(i32) -> i32, arg: i32) -> i32 {
+    // CHECK-LABEL: define{{.*}}foo{{.*}}!type !{{[0-9]+}}
+    // CHECK:       start:
+    // CHECK-NEXT:  %0 = bitcast i32 (i32)* %f to i8*
+    // CHECK-NEXT:  %1 = call i1 @llvm.type.test(i8* %0, metadata !"{{[[:print:]]+}}")
+    // CHECK-NEXT:  br i1 %1, label %type_test.pass, label %type_test.fail
+    // CHECK:       type_test.pass:
+    // CHECK-NEXT:  %2 = call i32 %f(i32 %arg)
+    // CHECK-NEXT:  br label %bb1
+    // CHECK:       type_test.fail:
+    // CHECK-NEXT:  call void @llvm.trap()
+    // CHECK-NEXT:  unreachable
+    f(arg)
+}
diff --git a/src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_emit_type_metadata.rs b/src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_emit_type_metadata.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..96fced47e78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/codegen/sanitizer_cfi_emit_type_metadata.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// Verifies that type metadata for functions are emitted.
+//
+// ignore-windows
+// needs-sanitizer-cfi
+// only-aarch64
+// only-x86_64
+// compile-flags: -Clto -Cno-prepopulate-passes -Zsanitizer=cfi
+
+#![crate_type="lib"]
+
+pub fn foo(f: fn(i32) -> i32, arg: i32) -> i32 {
+    // CHECK-LABEL: define{{.*}}foo{{.*}}!type !{{[0-9]+}}
+    // CHECK:       %1 = call i1 @llvm.type.test(i8* %0, metadata !"typeid1")
+    f(arg)
+}
+
+pub fn bar(f: fn(i32, i32) -> i32, arg1: i32, arg2: i32) -> i32 {
+    // CHECK-LABEL: define{{.*}}bar{{.*}}!type !{{[0-9]+}}
+    // CHECK:       %1 = call i1 @llvm.type.test(i8* %0, metadata !"typeid2")
+    f(arg1, arg2)
+}
+
+pub fn baz(f: fn(i32, i32, i32) -> i32, arg1: i32, arg2: i32, arg3: i32) -> i32 {
+    // CHECK-LABEL: define{{.*}}baz{{.*}}!type !{{[0-9]+}}
+    // CHECK:       %1 = call i1 @llvm.type.test(i8* %0, metadata !"typeid3")
+    f(arg1, arg2, arg3)
+}
+
+// CHECK: !{{[0-9]+}} = !{i64 0, !"typeid2"}
+// CHECK: !{{[0-9]+}} = !{i64 0, !"typeid3"}
+// CHECK: !{{[0-9]+}} = !{i64 0, !"typeid4"}
generated by cgit-pink 1.4.1-3-g733a5 (git 2.37.1) at 2025-11-06 04:43:48 +0000